Inside Sweden's standout IPO market

• Sweden now leads major EU economies in IPO activity, supported by a highly active domestic equity culture that enables even small and medium‑sized enterprises to go public.
• While Sweden’s capital markets are deep and accessible, aspects of its corporate governance framework continue to evolve.
• Family ownership and other distinctive features shape governance practices in ways that can present challenges for minority investors.

Sweden is now Europe’s most popular IPO listing location, ranking seventh globally for non-financial IPOs behind only China, India, the US, Japan, Australia and Korea (see Exhibit 1). More than 400 companies have listed in the Swedish market in the past decade – exceeding the combined total of Germany, France, Italy and the Netherlands.¹

Sweden’s market position is the result of a long-standing favourable ecosystem intentionally designed to channel capital efficiently to companies of all sizes. For example, SMEs in Sweden rely far more on public markets for funding than in other EU economies.

The country’s strong equity investment culture provides critical support, with households typically investing a significant portion of their savings into equities and other investment funds.²

Since 1978, Swedes have had access to special investment savings structures, today known as ISKs, and around 40% of the current population invest through these accounts. ISKs are estimated to hold more than SEK 1500 billion in wealth, with 88% invested in equity or balanced funds. ³

This vibrant ecosystem produces a strong pipeline of high‑growth companies. As some of these firms scale globally, they often seek the deeper liquidity and technology‑focused investor base of US exchanges – as seen with Spotify’s 2018 direct listing on the NYSE and Klarna’s 2025 IPO.

Sweden has a long and distinctive history of family ownership of listed companies, relative to the increasingly broadly distributed shareholder bases seen elsewhere in Europe. The five largest family-owned investment groups hold over 8% of domestic market capitalisation.⁴

These investment groups, often operating through long-established holding structures, maintain significant long-term stakes in major listed firms. We observe their strong focus on growth and return on capital employed, which can align well with the interests of minority and majority shareholders. The major shareholders engage actively with companies, frequently shaping board composition, strategy and long-term value creation.

However, there are important considerations.

Sweden’s political and regulatory environment has historically supported – and in some cases reinforced – long-term control structures. These include dual share class structures where A shares might have up to 10 votes per share compared with just one vote for B shares. Such mechanisms can be less favourable for minority shareholders.

Sweden also has a distinctive governance framework. One of the most striking – and misunderstood – features is the shareholder-driven nomination committee (Valberedningen). This entrusts board director appointments to major shareholders, rather than board committees or the board.

There is also a unique dual definition of independence for board members, positioning them as independent from both the company and from major shareholders. This facilitates the balance of power on corporate governance being weighted towards major shareholders.

While we are sanguine on some elements of Sweden’s governance model, other aspects represent potential risks for minority and non-domestic shareholders.

Sweden’s AGMs are often less transparent for those who do not physically attend meetings. Many meetings still rely on “voting by acclamation”, where resolutions are approved collectively by voice. This practice is rooted in tradition but raises questions about how votes sent electronically are appropriately considered through this method.

This also leads to limited disclosures of voting details. Most Swedish companies publish only whether resolutions have been passed or not, whereas other European markets typically provide more precise voting data. From an investor stewardship perspective, this makes it more difficult to monitor levels of support or dissent, as well as overall voting trends, and thereby establish a feedback loop for our engagements. This is out of sync with most European markets that have moved towards digital voting and detailed disclosures.

We recognise the need for governance standards to better reflect Sweden’s leadership position in new European listings. We will continue to articulate and advocate for alignment with international best practice, while engaging closely with Swedish companies and exercising our voting rights.

We believe raising governance standards would further enhance the appeal of Sweden’s capital markets. It would help bridge domestic ownership traditions with the expectations of non-domestic investors seeking strong governance, transparency and well-protected shareholder rights.

¹ Government of Sweden, The Swedish Capital Market in Brief (2025)
² OECD, The Swedish Equity Market, (2025)
³ Swedish Investment Foundation
⁴ OECD, The Swedish Equity Market, (2025)